A year after the October 7 attacks, there is much that calls for reflection: the memory of that fateful day, the surprising surge of antisemitism in the US, the nature of our strategic interests in the Middle East, and what it means to be a friend to Israel as it continues its war in Gaza. Most importantly, we should reflect on what a just ending to the conflict might be and whether a just ending is preferable to a prudent one. The war will end eventually. But whether that ending is a momentary pause before another round of violence or the beginning of a new era of peace in the Near East depends, perhaps entirely, on whether the region embraces religious pluralism. The best path for this was and remains the Abraham Accords.

　　It is no longer clear that Israel understands this fact. Having occupied Gaza for nearly a year, the Israeli Defense Forces are now turning their guns north to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Last month Benjamin Netanyahu expanded the formal aims of the war to include returning Israelis to their homes in the country’s northern border. Such a move is perfectly understandable and just to any decent person; Hezbollah is a terrorist organization that has harassed Israel’s north since October 8 of last year. It is also a proxy of Iran and a vocal supporter of Hamas. But the alleged clarity of justice can blind one to the dictates of prudence. Expanding the war does not just prolong the conflict and heighten the risk of unintended consequences, it further distracts from and endangers the future of the Abraham Accords. If Jerusalem, the “City of Righteousness,” hopes for peace, it should control its impulse to punish the wicked and instead re-focus its efforts to expand and consolidate the Abraham Accords.

　　The Success and Promise of the Accords

　　A year into Israel’s deadliest war since its founding, it is difficult to remember the relative stability and promise for hope that the Abraham Accords encouraged before October 7. Announced in September 2020, the Accords normalized relations between Israel and two Arab countries: the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. They sought to build a “culture of peace” through “interfaith and intercultural dialogue,” the promotion of “friendly relations among States,” the end of “radicalization,” and the support of “science, art, medicine, and commerce to … maximize human potential.” The language is vague and overly optimistic, especially so when one remembers that Arab public opinion of normalization at the time was incredibly low. But in the few years between the signing of the Accords and the launch of the Gaza War, they were accomplishing what they had set out to do.

　　The increase in volume and value of bilateral trade between Israel and the various Arab signatories is particularly impressive. Between 2022 and 2023, for example, the value of Israeli “Beverage and Tobacco” exports to the UAE increased by a factor of nine and of “Minerals and Metals” by fifty percent. Between 2020 and 2023, the value of cumulative trade between Israel and all Arab signatories (including Morocco and Sudan who joined later) more than quadrupled.

　　There was increased collaboration in several non-economic fields as well, from scientific research to joint humanitarian aid efforts and defense collaboration. In June 2023, for example, the UAE’s cybersecurity head, Mohammed al-Kuwaiti, acknowledged that Israel’s security system helped repel a cyber-attack on the country and that Israeli companies were helping the Emiratis build a “cyber iron dome.”

　　Finally, on the level of cultural mores, the Accords spurred progress. Commerce and collaboration are laudable in themselves, but they are better understood, following Montesquieu, as means for generating softer political personalities less prone to extremism and violence. Given that cultural change can take generations, a few years is hardly enough time to gauge the effectiveness of the Accords on this axis. But there were percolating signs before October 7. In Morocco, for example, textbooks distributed by the country’s Ministry of Education taught tolerance as a virtue and portrayed Jews in a more positive light, noting their patriotism and contribution to Morocco. They still don’t teach the Holocaust (that is too much to ask it seems), but any progress on this front is a welcome change.

　　The success of the Accords is perhaps most strongly attested to by how close Saudi Arabia came to joining them. The prized pony of all who want to expand the Accords, Saudi Arabia’s participation would spur progress on all of the above fronts. Not only is it the region’s largest economy, but as home to Mecca and Medina, it commands important cultural power in the Arab Muslim world as well. In particular, the symbolism of Saudi Arabia, the home of Wahhabism and formerly the leading exporter of jihadists, breaking bread with Israel would be a powerful image. It was nearly the crown jewel of Netanyahu’s political career; just weeks before October 7, Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammed bin Salman, told Fox News that a deal between the two countries was “very close.”

　　Israel seems to be assuming that the broader structural factors of Middle East security dynamics combined with American cultural commitment to Israel will provide sufficient cover to conduct the war as it wishes and resume business as usual afterward.

　　Taken together, these developments were the most promising and meaningful steps taken in the region to promote Israeli-Arab relations in a century. The Accords went far beyondthe stale promises of when Jordan and Egypt normalized relations decades ago; they were actually sparking commerce, collaboration, and cultural exchange. Continued success and expansion could, over time, change the cultural dynamic in the region that would have Israel pushed into the sea.

　　The Accords After October 7

　　All the enthusiasm for the Abraham Accords abruptly ended on October 7. The origins of the attacks are best understood in the context of the burgeoning relations between Jews and Arab Muslims engendered by the Accords. With Persian Gulf states (Palestine’s most generous Arab donors) normalizing relations with Israel, Hamas rightly saw that Palestine was losing its most influential patrons. It was a sign of how far Arab leaders were moving on this issue when Muhammad bin Salman called for a “home” for the Palestinians rather than a “state.” The October 7 attacks were not a random act of barbarism but were based on a strategic logic: by prompting Israel to retaliate, Hamas could generate widespread anti-Israel sentiment among Arabs thereby pressuring Arab governments to halt any steps towards normalization. To some extent, Hamas has proven successful.

　　Though no Arab state from the Accords has withdrawn, there has also been no expansion. In the UAE, where public hostility to Israel is lowest in the Arab world, the booming business dealings with Israelis have seemingly cooled. As one local businessman put it, “things have become more discreet” since October 7. In Morocco, the Israeli diplomatic mission only resumed activities ten months after the attack and was still met with mass protests. Saudi Arabia, of course, stopped official talks on normalization.

　　More important, Hamas succeeded in impressing the importance of the Palestinians on leaders of the Gulf countries. The Saudis have now made normalization contingent on a Palestinian state and the UAE has made peacekeeping troops contingent on a state as well. Whether the Israelis like it or not, the fate of the Abraham Accords is now tied to a sustainable political solution to Palestine. But rather than treat the opportunity to get rid of Hamas as the prelude to a state (or some form of responsible government), Israel has treated the war as a purely military affair, focusing on the singular objective of destroying Hamas with little effort to prepare for the political future of the Strip. While the destruction of Hamas is surely laudable after the atrocities of October 7, that destruction cannot come at the expense of long-term strategic thinking.

　　Successful counterinsurgencies turn on the occupying force’s ability to collaborate with the indigenous population; this is difficult when the enemy can still threaten civilians and when the population resides in camps ripe for radicalization.

　　The issue goes deeper than the high casualty count (40,000 deaths may well be proportionate to the war aim of destroying a deeply embedded group like Hamas); the issue is the lack of a political dimension to the invasion at all. One suspects that Israel is improvising. Indeed, it was not until he addressed the US Congress in June that Netanyahu gave some definition to the war aim of destroying Hamas: demilitarization and deradicalization. Similarly, plans to create humanitarian “bubbles” in which the IDF would work with local Gazans to distribute aid have largely come to naught, with little said about the endeavor since early summer. When one adds to this the recklessness of Israel’s bombing campaign (e.g., dropping thousand-pound bombs on densely packed targets) and the extent it has limited humanitarian deliveries, it is hard to argue that Israel is preparing for the political future of Gazans in its crusade. That Israel is now turning its focus to Lebanon only drives the point home.

　　Over the past few weeks, Israel has led a sophisticated campaign to cripple Hezbollah’s leadership, first with exploding pagers and then the assassination of its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. Just three days later, Israel embarked on a “limited ground operation” into Lebanon. A full-blown war in Lebanon, as opposed to the predictable and manageable tit-for-tat that has been conducted for the past year, would be catastrophic for various reasons, not the least of which is it would further risk a full war between Israel and Iran, a conflict that will be much longer and bloodier than the war with Hamas. Iran’s attack on Israel last Monday may well lock the two countries on this otherwise avoidable trajectory.

　　More importantly, expansion into Lebanon distracts from and prolongs stabilization and deradicalization efforts in the Gaza Strip. The job in Gaza is far from over; nearly half of Hamas’s fighting force survives while the population has been crammed into dense humanitarian zones where conditions are dire. Successful counterinsurgencies turn on the occupying force’s ability to collaborate with the indigenous population; this is difficult when the enemy can still threaten civilians and when the population resides in camps ripe for radicalization.

　　Israel seems to be assuming that the broader structural factors of Middle East security dynamics combined with American cultural commitment to Israel will provide sufficient cover to conduct the war as it wishes and resume business as usual afterward. This view is not without justification; the fact of Iranian aggression and subversion in the region was a driving force behind the Abraham Accords. But the Arab signatories see the security element as defensive in nature; by normalizing relations with Israel they hope to formalize an existing security cooperative approach to deter Iran and its Axis of Resistance. In other words, they do not seek further escalation with Iran with whom Saudi Arabia is actively maintaining a period of détente. Moreover, precisely because countries like Saudi Arabia have long cooperated with Israel, the need for the formalized security arrangement is far from pronounced.

　　Israel cannot forget that there are limits to the patience of the princes and emirs of Arabia who may see needless expansion of the war as evidence that Israel is just as destabilizing as Iran. Normalization is not risk-free for these leaders; Muhammad bin Salman reportedly told Secretary of State Blinken that “I could end up getting killed” because of normalization. Nor should Israel count on indefinite American support; the country is becoming increasingly unpopular among the American public, even among Evangelicals.

　　In both Gaza and Southern Lebanon, Israel must guard against choosing retribution over pragmatism. The former would justify reckless behavior in the name of avenging October 7 and putting an end to terrorists. The latter, however, demands that the country not jeopardize the success that the Abraham Accords have achieved in embedding Israelis once more among Arab Muslim populations. That Israel has inclined toward retribution reinforces an understated reason to get back to the Accords: it needs expanded interaction with Arabs for its own sake. The Accords, after all, are not just about security; they aim to decrease extremism—on both sides. Radicalism in Israel has been on the rise for years but has increased appreciably since October 7. Acquaintance with the other does not necessarily breed affection for the other, but it is more likely to soften harsh mores than the prolonged isolation that will follow should Israel continue down its current path.