This month marks 75 years since the founding of the NATO alliance. Celebrations will include two very capable new members of the alliance, Finland and Sweden, who opted to break from neutrality and join the alliance shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite NATO’s recent growth and defiant unity as Putin sought to fracture the alliance in the early days of Moscow’s assault on Ukraine, recent years have seen not only an impassioned debate about US support for Ukraine’s defense but also a reinvigorated debate about the United States’ commitment to NATO.

　　This debate is primarily playing out among certain segments of the American political right. It occurs against the backdrop of Congress trying to pass additional assistance for Ukraine as the country fights to liberate its territory from Russian forces, the misconception that Europe is lagging behind in military and economic assistance to Kyiv, China’s emergence as the US pacing threat, and a contentious presidential election rematch.

　　There is legitimate debate about the prioritization of US defense resources in what has been dubbed a new Cold War with the China-Russia-Iran axis. Some, like former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby, argue that Ukraine’s fight is noble, but that Europe must take the lead in arming Ukraine and in its own security so the that United States can focus on deterring an attack on Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and on defending its interests in the Indo-Pacific.

　　And while the conclusion is questionable, not least because China is backing Russia’s war, this argument for prioritization of the Indo-Pacific at the expense of arming Ukraine seemingly comes on earnest policy grounds. Others, however, have taken it further: bringing not only America’s support for Ukraine but also its commitment to NATO and Article V into question.

　　This debate culminated last month when former President Donald Trump publicly recalled conversations he had as president warning NATO leaders that he would allow and even “encourage” Russia to do whatever it wanted to the NATO members failing to meet the two percent of GDP threshold on defense.

　　Some ideologically aligned Senators quickly reinforced President Trump’s remarks. “I would be worried. I would be very worried. Especially if they dont have 2% of their GDP in defense. I mean youve got to be able to protect yourself—we cant protect everybody,” said Sen. Tommy Tuberville of Alabama. “I want to have a system where if you don’t pay, you get kicked out,” added Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.

　　But a central, and too often missing, point in the debate about NATO is that the allies most vulnerable to continued Russian aggression are the high performers, both since and in the lead-up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These Central and Eastern European nations largely meet the defense spending goals of the alliance, have moved quicker and harder to support Ukraine than Washington, and never lost sight of Russia’s ongoing threat to the alliance or the need for the hard power military edge to deter it.

　　It’s no mystery why these nations are attuned to the importance of a strong national defense. When multiple generations of your ancestors lived behind Moscow’s brutal Iron Curtain, it’s easier to believe Putin’s threats and think he will make good on them. Being upstanding members of NATO is also a way for these populations to exhibit their overwhelming gratitude for their sovereignty and reintegration with the West.

　　The strength of NATO is in its adversaries being convinced of NATO member nations’ capability to defend any member, and of its political resolve to defend any member. To the extent a lack of resolve is communicated, as former President Trump did, it risks creating fissures within the alliance and tempting adversary aggression.

　　What stands between NATO’s lowest spenders and Russian forces is a bloc of high contributing nations who are leading the way to re-energize the alliance and rectify Europe’s view of the threat.

　　The reality is the foot-draggers in NATO are largely located in Western Europe. What stands between these lower-on-average spenders on defense and Putin is this bloc of clear-eyed, high-contributing nations. But even if former President Trump would urge the United States to come to their defense based on their meeting these qualifications, his calling into question the American commitment to Article V of the alliance makes this more and not less likely. It is a profound and unforced error as the US seeks to deter further Russian aggression.

　　Last year, 11 NATO member states met the two percent threshold. Of those 11, eight are countries that have joined the alliance in the post-Cold War era. Those eight are Poland and Hungary (accession in 1999); Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania (2004); and Finland (2023). The United States, United Kingdom, and Greece make up the remaining three. In 2024, eighteen member states are on track to spend at least two percent of GDP on defense. Much of the credit goes to Putin, but also to former President Trump, who rightfully pushed the low spenders during his time in office. This year, NATO allies’ defense spending is on course for a six-fold increase since the 2014 Wales Declaration. That is an astounding accomplishment.

　　And it is the Eastern front nations who joined the alliance in the rounds of post-Cold War NATO enlargement that are leading the way. In 2022, the year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Poland was spending 2.4 percent of GDP on defense. That number jumped to 3.9 percent in 2023 and is set to exceed 4.0 percent of GDP in 2024. The government of Estonia in 2012—two years before the Wales Declaration—signed an agreement to boost and maintain defense spending at 2 percent of GDP. This year, Estonia’s defense expenditures will account for over 3 percent of GDP for the first time. Tallinn has also sent the equivalent of 1.35 percent of its total GDP in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

　　In 2022, another Eastern front nation, Lithuania, increased defense spending by almost 50 percent over the previous year. Vilnius’ defense spending for 2024 stands around 2.75 percent of GDP. And Latvia’s defense spending is planned at 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024, reaching 3 percent of GDP by 2027. That puts all the Baltic nations near the very top of the list of NATO member states who spend the most on defense, with Poland surpassing the United States as the NATO nation spending the highest percentage of its GDP on defense expenditures.

　　These same nations have been pushing the Biden administration to support Ukraine faster and with more advanced weaponry. Before Russia’s February 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries were sounding the alarm about the sincerity of the Russian threat. While the Biden administration dithered on a military aid package, on January 21, 2022, the Baltic states announced they had US approval to send weapons to Ukraine—Javelin anti-tank missiles from Estonia and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Latvia and Lithuania. Days later, on January 26, the Czech Republic announced a shipment of 152 mm ammunition to Kyiv. The frontline nations led and delivered at a crucial moment for the alliance.

　　While in office, former President Trump pushed allies to contribute more to collective defense, became the first US president to send Javelins to Ukraine, and imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2. These are all decisive achievements for European security, which he should take pride in.

　　But what stands between NATO’s lowest spenders and Russian forces is a bloc of high-contributing nations who are leading the way to re-energize the alliance and rectify Europe’s view of the threat. The correct message to send is that the United States has the back of these nations, that NATO must continue to do more, that the United States remains the coalescing force, and that Vladimir Putin better not dare to expand his war.